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Abstract. We analyse a recent image authentication scheme designed
by Chang et al. [Chang, C.-C., Hu, Y.-S., Lu, T.-C., 2006, A watermarking-
based image ownership and tampering authentication scheme. Pattern
Recognition Letters. 27, 439-446] whose rst step is based on a water-
marking scheme of Maniccam and Bourbakis [Maniccam, S.S., Bour-
bakis, N., 2004, Lossless compression and information hiding in images.
Pattern Recognition. 37, 475-486]. We show how the Chang et al. scheme
still allows pixels to be tampered, and furthermore discuss why its own-
ership cannot be uniquely binding. Our results indicate that the scheme
does not achieve its designed objectives of tamper detection and image
ownership.
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1 Introduction
An image authentication scheme allows to detect if any tampering has been
performed on an image. Examples of watermarking-based [1{3, 5{7, 9{12, 15{
20, 22{25] image authentication schemes are in [1{3, 5, 6, 10, 18, 22, 23, 25]. These
types of schemes typically embed a watermark into the image that is a function of
the image itself. For authentication, the watermark is recomputed and checked
against the embedded one, thus any changes of the image will not pass the
authentication check.
Chang et al. [5] recently proposed a watermarking-based image authentica-
tion scheme that is aimed to be secure against tampering. Its rst step is derived
from a SCAN-based [13] watermarking scheme by Maniccam and Bourbakis [14].
The dierence is that the Chang et al. scheme does not employ SCAN patterns
and makes use of a cryptographic hash function for feature extraction of the
image blocks.
In this paper, we show how this scheme can be tampered and also discuss why
its ownership is not uniquely binding. Our results disprove the security claims of
the scheme and conclude that it is not suitable for its designed purpose of image
authentication and rightful ownership.
2 The Image Authentication Scheme
The rst step of the image authentication scheme by Chang et al. is derived from
that of the information hiding scheme of Maniccam and Bourbakis [14]: this step
is used to decide on the number of embedded bits r for each pixel block.
The watermark embedding process extracts features of the image blocks and
then for each block it embeds a function of its feature as a watermark into the
middle pixel that represents that block. It is dened as follows:
A1. A grayscale image I of M N pixels is divided into M=2N=2 overlapping
blocks of size 3  3 pixels. The center of each block is the watermarkable
pixel px (where x is the block index) used for watermarking in each block.
A2. For each watermarkable pixel px, the extracted block feature is actually the
values of its eight-neighbours (as in standard computer graphics terminology)
denoted hpx1 ; : : : ; px8i; plus private information specic to the image namely
the block index x, image identication ID and the image owner's secret key
SK. See Fig. 1 for an illustration of a 3  3 block, formed by the dotted
boxes and px in the middle.
To be precise, the block feature is computed as
hbx1 ; : : : ; bx128i = H(px1 jj : : : jjpx8 jjxjjIDjjSK); (1)
where H is a cryptographic hash function outputting 128 bits, and jj denotes
concatenation.
A3. The block variation  is next computed as
 =
8X
i=1
(pxi   pxi+1 mod 8)2: (2)
A4. r is then determined as follows:
r =
8<:2; 0   < 83; 8   < 16
4; 16   < 255
A5. The 128-bit block feature hbx1 ; : : : ; bx128i is then padded with zeroes to a length
of 132 bits, and folded (compressed) into r bits as follows:
fx =
(132=r) 1M
i=0
(bxir+1jj : : : jjbxir+r); (3)
where
L
denotes exclusive-or sum.
A6. fx is then inserted into the r least signicant bits of the watermarkable
pixel px to obtain the watermarked pixel p^x. The image I with its water-
markable pixels px replaced with the watermarked pixels p^x forms the nal
watermarked image I^.
The image authentication process checks if the watermarked image I^ has
been tampered by recomputing the folded block features f 0x as per equation (3)
and comparing them against the features fx that had been embedded within
the watermarkable pixels px. It proceeds as follows:
B1. Steps (A1) through (A5) as dened above are performed, resulting in the
recomputed block features f
0x.
B2. For each block, f
0x is compared with the fx that had been embedded in px to
form the watermarked pixels p^x of the watermarked image I^. Equality means
the block has not been tampered, otherwise it will be marked as tampered.
2.1 Security Claims
To be precise, we list here the claims made by Chang et al. for their image
authentication scheme. In the next section we will demonstrate how these claims
can be disproved.
Claim 1 (Tamper Resistance) . The probability that each tampered block fails
to be detected is
(
1
2
)r ; 2  r  4:
Claim 2 (Rightful Ownership) . Only the person who owns the secret key
SK can prove the rightful ownership of the watermarked image; i.e. rightful
ownership fails if the adversary correctly guesses SK, which on average should
occur only with probability 2 k where k is the bit length of the secret key SK.
3 Tampering with the Scheme
3.1 Tampering the Watermarked Pixels
Recall that the Chang et al. scheme divides the image I of M  N pixels into
M=2N=2 overlapping blocks of size 3 3 pixels.
For instance, a 7  7 pixeled image will be divided into 3 3 (i.e. 9) blocks
of 3  3 pixels. See Fig. 1 where each pixel is represented by a box. For the
rst block (x = 1), its watermarkable pixel p1 is right in the middle, and the
8-neighbours of p1 are indicated by boxes with dots in them. Block 1 is a block
of 3 3 pixels formed by the dotted boxes and the p1 box.
Proposition 1 (Breaking the Tamper Resistance.) There exists an attack
that breaks the tamper resistance of the Chang et al. scheme with probability 1,
therefore disproving Claim 1.
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Fig. 1. Dividing the image into 3 3 blocks
Proof. The attack is as follows:
C1. Compute r as per step (A4) of the watermark embedding process.
C2. For each watermarked pixel p^x, tamper with the 8  r most signicant bits
of this pixel to obtain the tampered watermarked pixel ~px.
To see why the attack breaks the tamper resistance claim, we walk through
the steps of the image authentication process. Let the untampered watermarked
pixel be denoted as p^x.
B1. Recall that this step performs steps (A1) through (A5). Details are as follows:
A1. This step is performed on the tampered image to determine the blocks,
including the tampered watermarked pixels ~px within each block.
A2. This step extracts the block features hbx1 ; : : : ; bx128i as per equation (1).
The key observation here is that this equation does not depend on the
watermarked pixel (whether tampered or untampered, thus neither p^x
nor ~px). Hence, the block features hbx1 ; : : : ; bx128i computed by this step
for the tampered watermarked pixel ~px will equal the block features
computed for the untampered watermarked pixel p^x.
A3. Similarly, the computation of the block variation  does not depend
on the watermarked pixel, hence it is the same for both the tampered
watermarked pixel ~px and the untampered watermarked pixel p^x.
A4. Since r is a function of , again the same value is computed for both the
tampered and untampered watermarked pixels.
A5. Denote by f 0x the recomputed value as per equation (3). Since this equa-
tion is a function of the block features hbx1 ; : : : ; bx128i , hence the f 0x that
is recomputed at this step for the tampered watermarked pixel ~px is
the same as the fx computed for the untampered watermarkable pixel
px and embedded into the watermarkable pixel during the watermark
embedding process.
B2. Since the recomputed f 0x equals the fx embedded in the watermarked pixel
~px, the authentication check passes, and the block is marked as untampered.
This occurs with probability 1; signicantly higher than the probability of
( 12 )
r in Claim 1.
ut
In summary, for any image of M N pixels, we can modify the 8   r most
signicant bits of M2 N2 pixels without being detected, giving a total of (8 r)MN4
bits.
3.2 Tampering the Unwatermarked Pixels
We now show how the unwatermarked pixels (represented as dotted boxes in
Fig. 1) of a watermarked image can be tampered with while still passing the
authentication check, and how it leads to breaking the rightful ownership claim
of the Chang et al. scheme.
Proposition 2 (Breaking the Rightful Ownership.) There exists an attack
that breaks the rightful ownership of the Chang et al. scheme with probability 2 r
(<< 2 k), therefore disproving Claim 2.
Proof. The attack is as follows:
D1. Compute r as per step (A4) of the watermark embedding process.
D2. For each block x of the watermarked image I^, tamper with the 8 unwater-
marked pixels hpx1 ; : : : ; px8i to obtain the tampered pixels h~px1 ; : : : ; ~px8i. Denote
the resultant tampered watermarked image as ~I.
D3. Make 2 r guesses ~SK of the secret key value, compute the corresponding
block feature ~fx, and check for a match with the block feature fx embedded
in the watermarked pixel p^x. On average, one match is expected, and this is
the ~SK that is used by the adversary to lay ownership claims.
To see why this breaks the rightful ownership claim, we walk through the steps of
the image authentication process. Denote the untampered unwatermarked pixels
as hpx1 ; : : : ; px8i.
B1. Recall that this step performs steps (A1) through (A5). More details are as
follows:
A1. This step is performed on the tampered image ~I to determine the 3 3
blocks, where each block has the watermarked pixel p^x and its eight-
neighbours h~px1 ; : : : ; ~px8i which have been tampered with.
A2. With the secret key ~SK supplied by the adversary computed from step
(D3) above, this step extracts the block features h~bx1 ; : : : ;~bx128i as per
equation (1).
A3. This step computes the block variation ~ as per equation (2).
A4. This step computes the corresponding ~r as per step (A4).
A5. Denote by f 0x the recomputed value as per equation (3). Due to the
chosen ~SK that was computed in step (D3) to ensure that a recom-
puted block feature matches the one embedded in the image, thus the
recomputed f 0x will match the embedded fx.
B2. Since the recomputed f 0x equals the fx embedded in the watermarked image,
the authentication check passes, and since the provided secret key ~SK has
allowed this pass, the adversary is taken to be the rightful owner of the
image. This attack requires an oine computation (step D3) with success
probability 2 r; signicantly higher than the probability of 2 k in Claim 2.
ut
The intuition exploited here is that the actual folded block feature fx embedded
into the watermarkable pixel px is only an r-bit (2  r  4) value. In the
computation of fx, the only unknown is k-bit SK (stated as k =168 bits in [5]),
thus it would appear that in order to compute the correct fx after modifying
the unwatermarked pixels, requires to guess all k =168 bits of SK.
Nevertheless, due to the folding process used to produce fx, this is not re-
quired. Instead, since fx is only r bits (2  r  4), an attacker need only try a
few values for the secret key to recompute fx with the tampered values of the
unwatermarked pixels; and with a probability 2 r he will compute the same fx.
Thus repeating only 2r times (recall that this ranges from 22 to 24 times only)
he will know the appropriate ~SK to use, even though it is a dierent SK than
originally used by the image owner.
3.3 Non-Binding Image Ownership
We highlight another security issue for the Chang et al. scheme. Ownership
of the image is assumed based on the knowledge of the secret key SK used
to perform the watermark embedding process and later image authentication
process. However, since SK is secret and known only to a single person, there is
nothing that binds that secret SK to the identity of that person, and so he has
no way to undeniably prove that he owns an image.
Proposition 3 (Non-Binding Ownership) . The Chang et al. scheme can-
not provide binding ownership: an adversary can lay ownership claim without
knowing the value of the owner's secret key SK, therefore disproving Claim 2.
Proof. We illustrate with an attack description. Let the image watermarked
by its owner be denoted as I^.
E1. Perform steps (A1) through (A5) on the watermarked image I^, where instead
of the owner's secret key SK, the adversary uses an arbitrarily chosen value
~SK.
E2. Now perform step (A6) by inserting the computed block feature ~fx into the
r least signicant bits of the watermarkable pixel px, overwriting the initially
embedded fx; to obtain the watermarked image ~I.
Consider an adversary who lays ownership claim on the image ~I. He supplies his
secret key ~SK and indeed, anyone performing the image authentication process
would correctly be able to authenticate the image ~I, so implying that the adver-
sary rightfully owns the image, even though he does not know the value of the
owner's secret key SK. This disproves Claim 2. ut
Indeed, it appears that in order for this scheme to really provide rightful
ownership, that a trusted third party (TTP) is required to vouch that a particular
secret key SK binds to an image. Yet, various watermarking schemes as early
as 1998 already exist in literature [8] that achieve rightful ownership without
requiring a TTP.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have demonstrated how to tamper with both the watermarked and unwater-
marked pixels of an image that has been processed with the image authentication
scheme of Chang et al. [5]. We also highlighted that the scheme does not provide
unique binding of an image to an owner. Our results show that the scheme is not
secure for its designed application of image authentication and image ownership.
We suggest a thorough redesign by the authors before it can be used for prac-
tical applications, or alternatively to use other image authentication schemes in
literature e.g. [1{3, 5, 6, 14, 25].
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